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Uncertainty contributes to stress and anxiety-like behaviors by impairing the ability of
participants to objectively estimate threat. Our study used the cue-picture paradigm in
conjunction with the event-related potential (ERP) technique to explore the temporal
dynamics of anticipation for and response to uncertain threat in healthy individuals.
This task used two types of cue. While ‘certain’ cues precisely forecasted the valence
of the subsequent pictures (negative or neutral), the valence of pictures following
‘uncertain’ cues was not predictable. ERP data showed that, during anticipation,
uncertain cues elicited similar Stimulus-Preceding Negativity (SPN) to certain-negative
cues, while both of them elicited larger SPN than certain-neutral cues. During affective
processing, uncertainty enlarged the mean amplitude of late positive potential (LPP) for
both negative and neutral pictures. Behavioral data showed that participants reported
more negative mood ratings of uncertain-neutral pictures relative to certain-neutral
pictures and overestimated the probability of negative pictures following uncertain cues.
Importantly, the enlarged anticipatory activity evoked by uncertain cues relative to that
evoked by certain-neutral cues positively modulated the more negative mood ratings of
uncertain-neutral pictures relative to certain-neutral pictures. Further, this more negative
mood ratings and the general arousal anticipation during anticipatory stage contributed
to the covariation bias. These results can provide a novel insight into understanding the
neural mechanism and pathological basis of anxiety.
Keywords: uncertainty, altered anticipation, covariation bias, affection, ERP
INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty, the unknown probability, time and cost of a future event, is a phenomenon that
we encounter in our everyday lives. When the occurrence of an event is uncertain, identifying
its relationship with the current circumstance has survival benefits, which enables people to do
mental and motivational preparations and achieve desired outcomes (Alloy and Tabachnik, 1984).
However, people show inability to objectively assess the relationship between environmental cues
and potential outcomes and tend to highly estimate the frequency of threat (Grupe and Nitschke,
2011). Uncertainty also enlarges the processing of stimuli and leads to more negative experience of
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stimuli (Grupe and Nitschke, 2011; Dieterich et al., 2016).
Grupe and Nitschke (2013) proposes the model ‘Uncertainty
and Anticipation Model of Anxiety’ and highlights the core
role of anticipation in the processing of uncertainty. The
model suggests that, rather than exaggerated responses elicited
by uncertain threat, it is the anticipation of this threat that
is the key to understanding the neuropathological basis of
clinical and subclinical anxiety disorders. However, we still
know little about the neural mechanisms of anticipation of
future threat when its occurrence is uncertain. Whether the
neural anticipatory activity is altered by uncertainty? Whether
uncertain anticipation modulates participants’ subsequent neural
and behavioral responses to stimuli? What are the contributors
to people’s inability to objectively assess the relationship between
uncertain situation and threat?
When the occurrence of a negative event is uncertain,
individuals’ common and seemingly automatic reflection is to
estimate the probability of the event. Using the cue-picture
paradigm, Grupe and Nitschke (2011) detected the expectancy
bias under uncertainty. That was participants tended to anticipate
negative pictures after uncertain cues. In this task, participants
were required to passively view either negative or neutral
pictures which were preceded by three types of cue (certain-
negative cue, certain-neutral cue or an uncertain cue). While
both the certain-negative cue and the certain-neutral cue always
predicted the negative and neutral pictures, respectively, the
uncertain cue predicted either a negative or neutral picture
according to a 50/50 ratio. Participants, however, were given
no information about this percentage prior to the experiment,
and were asked to report their anticipation of the percentage
of negative picture following uncertain cues by rating at the
expectancy scale prompted “Expect aversive picture?” The result
indicated that individuals thought uncertain cues were more
likely to be followed by negative pictures, which was deemed as
expectancy bias. This directly reported index suggests that people
have altered anticipation for uncertain future threat. However,
whether this altered anticipation could be detected at neural level
is still unclear.
Stimulus-Preceding Negativity (SPN) is a slow cortical event-
related potential (ERP) component and is observed during the
anticipation of a forthcoming stimulus (Van Boxtel and Böcker,
2004). Studies have identified that the presentation of pictures
varying in emotional content can reliably yield this component
(Simons et al., 1979; Klorman and Ryan, 1980; Lumsden et al.,
1986; Amrhein and Pauli, 2005), specifically, emotional salience
pictures yield larger SPN than neutral pictures (Klorman and
Ryan, 1980; Bradley et al., 2001). The enlarged amplitude of SPN
is evidenced to be more related to arousal rather than valence.
Both high arousal negative and positive stimuli can produce
pronounced SPN (Poli et al., 2007) by activating defensive
and appetitive motivational systems, respectively (Bradley et al.,
2001). Thus, our study would use the cue-picture paradigm with
ERP technique to explore the anticipatory activities reflected
by the amplitude of SPN. The categories of materials included
were neutral and negative pictures, which were the same
as those included in previous studies to research uncertain
anticipation (Sarinopoulos et al., 2010; Grupe and Nitschke, 2011;
Dieterich et al., 2016, 2017). Positive pictures were not
recruited, since they might interfere with the detection of biased
anticipation for negative pictures by eliciting a pronounced SPN
(Poli et al., 2007). In addition, in order to capture participants’
automatic and natural anticipatory arousal, our study would
not include the expectancy rating scale. Although the intention
of this scale is to explicitly detect the anticipatory rating of
participants, it may also have the unintended consequences
of contaminating the natural neural anticipatory activities. For
example, the expectancy scale forces participants to make an
explicit choice about the outcome and thus enter a different state
of anticipation compared to the more natural state in which
the possibility of either a negative or neutral outcome remains
unresolved. Based on previous studies (Bradley et al., 2001; Grupe
and Nitschke, 2011), we supposed to see larger SPN after certain-
negative and uncertain cues relative to certain-neutral cues.
Expectancy is of great importance since it can dramatically
influence people’s responses to a diversity of events. For example,
placebo reduces participants’ reported pain of shock (Wager
et al., 2004), and misleading the expectancy of aversive taste
can dampen participants’ reports of the aversiveness of the taste
(Nitschke et al., 2006). Thus, when the occurrence of threat
is uncertain, the anticipation of the potential outcome may be
an important factor in participants’ perception of and response
to the outcomes. During the study of Grupe and Nitschke
(2011), participants were asked to rate their mood after viewing
each picture. Results showed that participants reported more
negative mood ratings of uncertain-negative pictures relative
to certain-negative pictures, indicating uncertainty intensified
emotional experience. This uncertainty-related effect on emotion
has also been evidenced in other study (Bar-Anan et al.,
2009), which might be related to the expectancy bias of
uncertain threat. Thus, we expected to see more negative
mood ratings of pictures under uncertainty compared to
certainty and that these more negative mood ratings would
be partly attributed to the altered anticipatory activities under
uncertainty.
The anticipatory activities have also been evidenced to be
associated with the neural processing of subsequent stimuli.
Using the cue-picture paradigm in conjunction with functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Sarinopoulos et al. (2010)
found the activation of anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) during
the anticipatory stage, a region referring to the anticipation-
driven modulatory function and regulation of emotional
response (Petrovic et al., 2005; Phan et al., 2005; Etkin et al.,
2006; Sarinopoulos et al., 2006; Egner et al., 2008), and
the activations of insula and amygdala during processing of
pictures, two regions implicated in interoception and vigilance
for motivational salience separately (Craig, 2002; Critchley,
2004, 2005). In particular, the anticipatory activities of ACC
elicited by uncertain cues relative to certain-negative cues were
inversely related to enhanced activations of insula and amygdala
responding to uncertain-negative pictures relative to certain-
negative pictures. These results suggest a modulation effect
of anticipatory activities on the subsequent neural processing of
pictures. However, considering the low temporal resolution of
fMRI, which might limit the explanation of these results, ERP
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would be a useful tool to further probe into this question by
precisely separating cue stage from picture stage.
Studies of uncertainty using ERP technique showed that
pictures under uncertain condition elicited larger amplitudes
of P2 and late positive potential (LPP) than pictures under
certain condition (Dieterich et al., 2016). P2, a positive deflection
at frontal–central areas, beginning around 200 ms after the
presentation of stimulus, reflects the early selective attention and
is larger for stimuli of emotional salience (Dan and Hajcak, 2008;
Carretié et al., 2013). LPP, a slow positive deflection, beginning
around 300 ms after the presentation of a stimulus, is enlarged by
motivational stimuli (Cuthbert et al., 2000). The enlarged P2 and
LPP for uncertain stimuli relative to certain stimuli (Dieterich
et al., 2016) indicated that uncertainty increased the attention
allocation to the processing of stimuli, which was consistent with
the fMRI study (Sarinopoulos et al., 2010). Thus, in our study, we
expected to see that uncertainty would enlarge the amplitude of
P2 and LPP for both negative and neutral pictures. In addition,
based on the study of Sarinopoulos et al. (2010), we assumed
that the anticipatory activities reflected by the mean amplitude of
SPN would negatively modulate the neural responses to pictures
reflected by the mean amplitude of LPP.
During the cue-picture paradigm, participants were also asked
to assess the frequency of negative pictures following uncertain
cues at the end of the task (Grupe and Nitschke, 2011). Results
showed that, though participants had been multiply exposed to
the relationship between uncertain cues and potential outcomes,
they still misjudged the possibility of uncertain cues followed
by negative pictures, which was described as a covariation bias.
Covariation bias has been observed in studies using fear-relevant
cues (Barlow, 1988; de Jong et al., 1995b; Amin and Lovibond,
1997; Buhr and Dugas, 2002; Hermann et al., 2004), indicating
that uncertain cue may play a role akin to the fear-relevant cue.
This increased estimation of relationship between uncertainty
and threat was evidenced to be partly attributed to the expectancy
bias (Grupe and Nitschke, 2011). That was, the more participants
expected a negative picture following the uncertain cue, the
larger they reported the frequency of negative pictures following
uncertain cues at the end of the experiment. This modulated
effect was also detected on neural level. Sarinopoulos et al.
(2010) found the anticipatory activity of ACC was positively
correlated with the post-experimental estimations, suggesting
that the anticipatory activities under uncertainty might predict
or at least partly account for the covariation bias. So, our study
supposed to see the covariation bias reflected by overestimation
of the frequency of negative pictures following uncertain cues
and the positive correlation between this bias and uncertain
anticipatory activities (the amplitude of SPN under uncertainty).
One thing to be noted in the study of Grupe and Nitschke
(2011) is that, though participants presented the expectancy
bias, they didn’t report covariation bias. This inconsistency of
expectancy bias and covariation bias is also reported in previous
studies using fear-relevant cues. Expectancy bias of threat after
fear-relevant cues was frequently reported in both healthy
populations and anxiety patients (Mcnally and Heatherton, 1993;
Amin and Lovibond, 1997; Kennedy et al., 1997) while the
covariation bias was rarely detected in healthy populations and
was consistently observed in patients (de Jong et al., 1995b; Pauli
et al., 1998). This inconsistency indicates that covariation bias
might be partly attributed to but not fully arise from expectancy
bias. Covariation bias is supposed to reflect an affective matching
that people tend to display a bias to associate emotional
stimuli with the matching emotional contexts (Tomarken et al.,
1989, 1995). For example, people overestimate the frequency of
shocks following the presentation of fearful stimuli compared to
innocuous stimuli (Tomarken et al., 1989, 1995; de Jong et al.,
1992). This affective matching is of emotion specificity, that anger
and sadness bias the likelihood estimations of angering and sad
events, separately (Desteno et al., 2000). The study of Vanoyen
and Vrana (2000) used four kinds of materials (negative valence,
high arousal; negative valence, low arousal; positive valence,
high arousal; positive valence, low arousal) in conjunction
with light flash, as a visual startle-producing stimulus, explored
how both valence and arousal affected the covariation bias
(the overestimation of the frequency of flash light). Results
showed that participants reported larger percentage of startle
probes occurring during high-arousal imagery than during low-
arousal imagery. Also, they reported larger percentage of startle
probes occurring during negative imagery than positive imagery.
These results suggest that both valence and arousal dimensions
of emotion influence the post-experimental estimations. Based
on previous study (Grupe and Nitschke, 2011), uncertainty
produced more negative mood ratings of pictures. Thus, we
assumed the more negative mood ratings of pictures caused by
uncertainty might be an important contributor to covariation
bias.
In conclusion, our study, using cue-picture paradigm in
conjunction with ERP technique, would explore the temporal
dynamics of stimuli processing under uncertainty and the
modulation effect of anticipation on subsequent responses to
stimuli and covariation bias. First, we hypothesized that certain-
negative cues and uncertain cues would elicit larger SPN
compared to certain-neutral cues during the cue stage and
negative pictures would elicit larger P2 and LPP relative to neutral
pictures and uncertainty would enlarge the amplitude of P2 and
LPP during picture stage. For behavioral reports, more negative
mood ratings were expected for negative pictures relative to
neutral pictures and for pictures under uncertainty compared
to certainty. Second, we hypothesized that altered anticipatory
activities by uncertainty would contribute to more negative
mood ratings of pictures. Specifically, anticipatory activities
elicited by uncertain cues relative to certain-negative cues (the
difference mean amplitude of SPN) would contribute to more
negative mood ratings of uncertain-negative pictures relative
to certain-negative pictures. Similarly, anticipatory activities
elicited by uncertain cues relative to certain-neutral cues (the
difference mean amplitude of SPN) would contribute to more
negative mood ratings of uncertain-neutral pictures relative
to certain-neutral pictures. Third, we hypothesized that the
neural anticipatory activities would modulate the subsequent
neural processing of pictures. Specifically, anticipatory activities
elicited by uncertain cues relative to certain-negative cues (the
difference mean amplitude of SPN) would be inversely related
to neural processing of uncertain-negative pictures relative
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to certain-negative pictures (the difference mean amplitude
of P2 and LPP). Similarly, anticipatory activities elicited by
uncertain cues relative to certain-neutral cues (the difference
mean amplitude of SPN) would be inversely related to neural
processing of uncertain-neutral pictures relative to certain-
neutral pictures (the difference mean amplitude of P2 and LPP).
Fourth, there would be a covariation bias that participants
would overestimate the percentage of negative pictures following
uncertain cues and this bias would be attributed to both the
anticipation of uncertain threat (the amplitude of SPN elicited
by uncertain cue) and the more negative mood ratings of pictures
under uncertain condition relative to certain condition.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Thirty-one healthy individuals (seventeen males; mean
age ± SD = 22.8 ± 1.76) made up of undergraduate and
graduate students were recruited from colleges in Beijing,
China to participate in our study. All were right handed, had
normal or corrected to normal vision and reported no current
or past history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. Written
informed consent was obtained from all of the participants
and a guaranteed monetary compensation (80 yuan RMB) was
given to every subject. During analysis, the outlying data of
one participant was excluded, leaving a remaining group of 30
healthy individuals (16 males; mean age ± SD = 22.6 ± 1.82).
All procedures were approved by the ethics committee of the
Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Materials
We selected 36 negative pictures and 36 neutral pictures from the
International Affective Pictures System (IAPS; Lang et al., 2008),
in which the normative ratings of valence for each picture range
from 1 (negative) to 9 (positive) and ratings of arousal range
from 1 (calm) to 9 (arousal). In our study, the selected negative
pictures had a mean valence rating of 2.77 (SD = 0.67), and a
mean arousal rating of 6.49 (SD = 0.29). The neutral pictures had
a mean valence rating of 5.29 (SD = 0.12), and a mean arousal
rating of 3.34 (SD = 0.39). The pictures following the certain
cue and uncertain cue were different. The valence and arousal
ratings of the 24 negative pictures recruited in certain-negative
trials (valence rating: 2.77 ± 0.69; arousal rating: 6.49 ± 0.27)
and those of the 12 negative pictures recruited in uncertain-
negative trials (valence rating: 2.78 ± 0.65; arousal rating:
6.49 ± 0.33) were not significantly different [valence rating:
t(34,1) =−0.06, p = 0.95; arousal rating: t(34,1) = 0.050, p = 0.96].
Also, the valence and arousal ratings of the 24 neutral pictures
presented on certain-neutral trials (valence rating: 5.27 ± 0.11;
arousal rating: 3.38 ± 0.38) and those of the 12 neutral pictures
presented on uncertain-neutral trials (valence rating: 5.34± 0.13;
arousal rating: 3.27 ± 0.40) were not significantly different
[valence rating: t(34,1) = −1.56, p = 0.13; arousal rating:
t(34,1) = 0.828, p = 0.41]. Differences in the valence and arousal
ratings between aversive pictures and neural pictures for certain
trials [valence rating: t(34,1) = −17.61, p < 0.001, d = −5.06;
arousal rating: t(34,1) = 32.86, p < 0.001, d = −9.43], were
similar to corresponding differences for uncertain trials [valence
rating: t(34,1) = −13.31, p < 0.001, d = −5.46; arousal rating:
t(34,1) = 21.26, p < 0.001, d = −8.78].
Paradigm
As shown in Figure 1, we used a cue-picture paradigm similar
to that used in the study of Sarinopoulos et al. (2010). First, one
of three white characters, “X,” “−,” “?” was presented on a black
screen for 300 ms indicating the kind of the upcoming picture
on each trial. The cross and minus marks were always followed
by certain-neutral and certain-negative pictures, respectively,
while the question marks were followed by either neutral or
negative pictures according to a 50/50 ratio. Participants were
explicitly informed about the nature of cue-picture pairings for
certain-negative and -neutral pictures, however, they were not
told about the precise presentation probability of negative or
neutral pictures that followed question marks (uncertain cues).
The inter-stimulus interval featured a black screen and ranged
from 1000 ms to 1200 ms to evoke participants’ anticipation for
the impending stimulus. Then, the picture corresponding to the
cue that preceded it was presented on a black screen for 1000 ms.
Following picture presentation, participants were immediately
asked to rate how the picture affected their mood by turning
a dial with their right hand to move a cursor along the VAS.
The scale consisted of nine rulings ranging from the first (“very
negative”), third (“negative”), intermediate (“neutral”), seventh
(“positive”) to the last (“very positive”), scoring “0–100” from the
left to the right of the scale continuously. Once participants made
a response, the scale was replaced by a jittered 500 ms to 800 ms
inter-trial interval featuring a black screen and a white plus sign.
The procedure consisted of three runs, and each run was
made up of 24 certain-neutral trials, 24 certain-negative trials,
12 uncertain-negative trials, and 12 uncertain neutral trials. The
whole course of the experiment lasted about 40 min. At the end
of each run, a scale (from 0 to 100) was presented on the screen
with the question “What was the percentage of question marks
followed by negative pictures?” This scale was used to compute
participants’ post-experiment estimation of uncertain threat. For
each kind of trial (certain-negative trial, certain-neutral trial,
uncertain-negative trial, and uncertain-neutral trial), the order of
the pictures was randomized in each run and reshuﬄed across
the different runs, and each picture was presented three times.
Participants conducted the task in a sound-proof and electrically
shielded room. Before the formal experiment began, participants
performed three practice blocks to familiarize themselves with
the paradigm. ERPs were recorded during the whole process.
EEG Recording
Continuous EEG data was recorded with the Neuroscan
Synamp2 Amplifier and 64 Ag/AgCl electrodes in accordance
with the 10/20 system. All signals were digitized using a band-
pass filter of 0.05–100 Hz and at a sample rating of 1000 Hz
in AC mode. All electrodes were on-line referenced to the left
mastoid. Electrode impedance was kept below 5 k throughout
the experiment. The vertical and horizontal electrooculograms
(EOG) were recorded for the oﬄine eye-movement correction
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FIGURE 1 | The experimental procedure.
of the data. The electrodes on the supra-orbital and infra-orbital
places of the left eye were recorded as the vertical EOG, while the
electrodes on the outer canthi of both eyes were recorded as the
horizontal EOG.
Data Analysis
We conducted the oﬄine analysis using Neuroscan 4.3. Raw data
were off-line re-referenced to half recorded right mastoid, such
that the data were finally referenced to an average of the original
left and right mastoids through on-line and off-line references.
After removing ocular artifacts using the default parameter of the
SCAN 4.3 ocular artifact tool, a low pass filter of 16 Hz (24 dB/oct,
zero phase filter) was conducted.
Signal data were epoched into cue-locked phase, the duration
since the onset of the cue and before the presentation of picture,
and picture-locked phase, the duration since the onset of the
picture and before the next trial. During cue-locked phase, we
analyzed the component SPN. The averaged epoch was 1500 ms
with a 200 ms pre-cue onset as the baseline, 300 ms presentation
of the cue and 1000 ms after the presentation of cue. Based
on previous studies (Wynn et al., 2010; Lin et al., 2014) and
visual detection, the following 12 electrodes were selected to
conduct statistical analysis: AF3, FPZ, AF4, F3, FZ, F4, FC3,
FCZ, FC4, C3, CZ, C4. The mean amplitude of SPN was
calculated in time window 800–1300 ms. Three within-subject
factors (Cue condition: certain-negative cue, certain-neutral cue,
uncertain cue; Site: prefrontal area, frontal area, frontal–central
area, central area; Laterality: left line area, midline area, right
line area) were recruited to the three-way repeated measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA). The factor Cue condition was
used to detect the differences among the processing of different
conditions, the factor Site was used to examine the brain
distribution of the component SPN, and the Laterality was used
to check the lateralized effect of the component SPN. During the
picture-locked phase, we analyzed components P2 and LPP. The
averaged epoch was 1200 ms with a 200 ms pre-stimulus onset
as the baseline and 1000 ms presentation of pictures. Based on
previous literature (Lin et al., 2012, 2015; Dieterich et al., 2017)
and the visual inspection, the two components were measured
in the following electrodes: F3, FZ, F4, FC3, FCZ, FC4, C3, CZ,
C4 (P2); F3, FZ, F4, FC3, FCZ, FC4, C3, CZ, C4, CP3, CPZ,
CP4, P3, PZ, P4 (LPP). For P2, we selected the time window
100–250 ms to calculate the peak amplitude and latency. Data of
both peak amplitude and latency were entered into a four-way
repeated measures ANOVA. The four within-subject factors were
Certainty (certain, uncertain), Valence (negative, neutral), Site
(frontal area, frontal–central area, central area), and Laterality
(left line, midline, right line) to explore the manipulation effect
of Certainty and Valence on P2 and the brain distribution and
lateralization of P2. For LPP, we chose the time window 300–
700 ms to analyze the mean amplitude. A four-way repeated
measures ANOVA was conducted with factors of Certainty
(certain, uncertain), Valence (negative, neutral), Site (frontal area,
frontal–central area, central area, central–parietal area, parietal
area), and Laterality (left line area, midline area, right line
area). The Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon was applied to correct all
ANOVA results.
For behavioral mood ratings, data were subjected to a two-
way repeated measures ANOVA. The two within-subject factors
(Certainty: certain, uncertain; Valence: negative, neutral) were
implemented to analyze how certainty of condition and valence
of pictures modulate the emotional experiences of individuals.
One of our hypotheses was that more negative mood ratings
of pictures were related to altered anticipatory activity, so we
first averaged the mean amplitudes of SPN for each condition
across all selected electrodes. Then, we regressed the grand mean
amplitude of SPN elicited by uncertain cues relative to certain-
negative cues against mood ratings of uncertain-negative pictures
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relative to certain-negative pictures. Similarly, we regressed
the grand mean amplitude of SPN elicited by uncertain cues
relative to certain-neutral cues against mood ratings of uncertain-
neutral pictures relative to certain-neutral pictures. To explore
the modulated effect of anticipation on the neural processing
of pictures, we first averaged the mean amplitude of LPP and
the peak amplitude of P2 for each condition across all selected
electrodes to get the grand mean amplitude of LPP and the
grand peak amplitude of P2. Then, linear regressions were
performed, regressing the grand mean amplitude of SPN elicited
by uncertain cues relative to certain-negative cues against the
grand mean amplitude of LPP and the grand peak amplitude
of P2 yielded by uncertain-negative pictures relative to certain-
negative pictures, respectively. Similarly, linear regressions were
performed between the grand mean amplitude of SPN elicited by
uncertain cues compared to certain-neutral cues and the grand
mean amplitude of LPP and the grand peak amplitude of P2
yielded by uncertain-neutral pictures relative to certain-neutral
pictures, respectively.
To test for the presence of a covariation bias of uncertainty and
negative pictures, we tested the post-experimental estimations of
participants against a 50% baseline using a one-sample t-test, with
a higher score than 50% reflecting a bias. Then, we conducted
the regression between the grand mean amplitude of SPN
produced by uncertain cues and scores of post-experimental
estimations. If there was a correlation, we further regressed the
grand mean amplitude of SPN produced by certain-negative
cues and certain-neutral cues against scores of post-experimental
estimations, to explore whether the relationship between the
uncertain anticipatory activity and the covariation bias was
specific. To explore whether mood contributes to covariation
bias, we regressed mood ratings of uncertain-negative pictures
relative to certain-negative pictures against post-experimental
estimations. Similarly, we regressed mood ratings of uncertain-




Figure 2 displays the results of mood rating. The Certainty
by Valence repeated measures ANOVA produced a significant
main effect of Valence [F(1,29) = 564.96, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.95],
indicating that mood elicited by negative pictures was more
negative than that elicited by neutral pictures. Although, there
was no significant main effect of Certainty [F(1,29) = 1.01,
p = 0.324, η2p = 0.03], we did observe an interaction effect between
Certainty and Valence was marginal significant [F(1,29) = 3.97,
p = 0.058, η2p = 0.12]. Simple analysis showed that the Valence
factor was still significant under both certain [t(29) = −22.20,
p < 0.001, d = −31.17] and uncertain [t(29) = −24.57, p < 0.001,
d =−33.12] conditions. That is, mood ratings of negative pictures
were rated more negatively than mood ratings of neutral pictures.
The Certainty factor played a significant role in emotional
responses to neutral pictures. That is, mood ratings of uncertain-
neutral pictures were rated more negatively than mood ratings of
certain-neutral pictures [t(29) = −1.82, p = 0.079, d = −0.93].
This uncertainty-related effect was not detected for negative
pictures, where we observed a non-significant difference between
mood ratings of uncertain-negative pictures and certain-negative
pictures [t(29) = 1.06, p = 0.299, d = 0.28].
FIGURE 2 | The average scores for mood rating. Error bars represent standard error of mean. ‘∗’ indicates the P-value of statistical result of uncertain-neutral
pictures relative to certain-neutral pictures, p = 0.079; ‘∗∗’ indicates the P-value of statistical result of certain-negative pictures relative to certain-neutral pictures,
p < 0.001; ‘∗∗∗’ indicates the P-value of statistical result of uncertain-negative pictures relative to uncertain-neutral pictures, p < 0.001.
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FIGURE 3 | Grand-averaged event-related potentials in midline electrodes during cue-locked phase. Negative represents the certain-negative cue, uncertain
represents the uncertain cue and neutral represents the certain-neutral cue.
By comparing post-experimental estimation score against a
50% baseline using a one-sample t-test, we observed a covariation
bias. Participants estimated the percentage of negative pictures
that followed uncertain cues as 65% (SD = 17.84), significantly




Figure 3 displays the cue-locked ERP of SPN. Three-way repeated
measures ANOVA of SPN exhibited a significant main effect for
both the Cue [F(1.99,57.84) = 6.01, p = 0.004, η2p = 0.17] and
Laterality [F(1.27,36.57) = 39.48, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.58]. The main
effect for Site was not significant [F(1.48,42.74) = 2.46, p = 0.112,
η2p = 0.08]. Post hoc analyses of Cue indicated that the mean
amplitude of SPN for certain-neutral cues was less negative than
for both certain-negative cues [t(29) = 3.50, p = 0.002, d = 2.93]
and uncertain cues [t(29) = 2.12, p = 0.043, d = 1.77], while
the amplitude for uncertain cues was not different from the
amplitude for certain-negative cues [t(29) = −1.31, p = 0.202,
d = −1.14]. The only significant interaction effect was detected
between Site and Laterality [F(3.11,90.27) = 5.91, p = 0.001,
η2p = 0.17]. Simple analysis of the interaction between Site and
Laterality indicated that SPN was right lateralization on every
Site (all p < 0.034) and was larger at frontal–central and central
electrodes than at anterior-frontal and frontal electrodes on
central and right hemisphere (all p < 0.087).
Picture-Locked ERPs
P2
ANOVA of the peak for P2 with four factors (Certain, Valence,
Site, and Laterality) revealed only a significant main effect of
Valence [F(1,29) = 23.29, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.46, see Figure 4].
The effects for Certainty [F(1,29) = 0.05, p = 0.832, η2p < 0.01],
Site [F(1.08,31.29) = 2.38, p = 0.13, η2p = 0.08] and Laterality
[F(1.71,49.72) = 1.94, p = 0.160, η2p = 0.06] were not significant.
Also, we did not observe any significant interaction effect.
Repeated measures ANOVA of latency for P2 yielded a significant
main effect for Certainty [F(1,29) = 8.65, p = 0.006, η2p = 0.23],
Valence [F(1,29) = 13.39, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.32] and Site
[F(1.15,33.28) = 7.42, p = 0.008, η2p = 0.20] but not Laterality
[F(1.43,41.33) = 0.95, p = 0.370, η2p = 0.03]. There was a
marginal significant interaction between Certainty and Valence
[F(1,29) = 2.64, p = 0.115, η2p = 0.08]. Simple analysis indicated
that uncertainty postponed the latency of P2 for neutral pictures
[t(29) = 3.37, p = 0.002, d = 2.39] while there was no difference of
latency for P2 between uncertain-negative pictures and certain-
negative pictures [t(29) = 1.00, p = 0.323, d = 0.65]. Negative
pictures evoked slower P2 than neutral pictures under both
certain [t(29) = 3.27, p = 0.003, d = 2.86] and uncertain conditions
[t(30) = 2.67, p = 0.012, d = 1.69].
LPP
There was a significant main effect of Valence [F(1,29) = 56.93,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.67] that negative pictures developed more
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FIGURE 4 | Grand-averaged event-related potentials in midline electrodes during picture-locked phase. The four conditions indicate the four kinds of pictures,
certain-neutral picture, uncertain-neutral picture, certain-negative picture and uncertain-negative picture.
positive LPP than neutral pictures and Certainty [F(1,29) = 8.76,
p = 0.006, η2p = 0.23] that uncertainty enlarged the amplitude
of LPP for negative and neutral pictures (see Figure 4 and
Supplementary Figure S1). However, there was no interaction
effect between Valence and Certainty [F(1,29) = 2.41, p = 0.13,
η2p = 0.08]. The main effect of Laterality [F(1.37,39.76) = 0.95,
p = 0.650, η2p = 0.02] was not significant while there was a
significant main effect of Site [F(1.17,33.83) = 56.43, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.66]. Post hoc analysis showed that the mean amplitude
of LPP increased gradually from frontal area to parietal area (all
p < 0.017). In addition, Valence significantly interacted with Site
[F(1.25,36.32) = 20.48, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.41]. Simple analysis
indicated that the effect of Valence exerted itself at every level
of Site (all p < 0.001) while the distributions of LPP were
different for negative and neutral pictures. For neutral pictures,
LPP increased gradually from frontal area to parietal area and the
largest LPP was observed at the parietal region (all p < 0.001).
For negative pictures, LPP increased gradually from frontal area
to central–parietal area and the largest LPP was observed at the
central–parietal and parietal regions (all p < 0.001) while there
was no significant difference between the two regions (p = 0.127).
Regression Data
Figure 5 displays the results of regression analysis. The grand
mean amplitude of SPN produced by uncertain cues relative
to certain-neutral cues modulated mood ratings of uncertain-
neutral pictures relative to certain-neutral pictures (β = 0.388,
p = 0.034, R2 = 0.12). This result indicates that the larger
the difference in anticipatory activities between uncertain and
certain-neutral conditions, the more negative the mood ratings
were for uncertain-neutral pictures compared to certain-neutral
pictures. However, this modulated effect was not detected
between the grand mean amplitude of SPN for uncertain
cues relative to certain-negative cues and the mood ratings of
uncertain-negative pictures relative to certain-negative pictures.
There was also no significant result found for the regression
analyses between neural anticipatory activities and the neural
processing of pictures (including P2 and LPP).
Analysis of the contributors to covariation bias showed that
the grand mean amplitude of SPN elicited by uncertain cues
positively modulated post-experimental estimations (β = −0.42,
p = 0.021, R2 = 0.15), indicating that the larger the anticipation
for uncertain threat was, the larger the covariation bias
became. To detect whether this modulation effect of uncertain
anticipation was specific to covariation bias, we further regressed
the grand mean amplitude of SPN elicited by certain-negative
cues and certain-neutral cues against the covariation bias,
respectively. Results showed that covariation bias was also
modulated by anticipatory activity for certain-negative pictures
(β = −0.39, p = 0.033, R2 = 0.12) as well as anticipatory activity
for certain-neutral pictures (β = −0.44, p = 0.014, R2 = 0.17).
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FIGURE 5 | Diagrams of regressions. (A–C) Represent the modulation effects of SPN evoked by uncertain cues, certain-neutral cues and certain-negative cues on
the post-experimental estimations of negative pictures following uncertain cues, respectively. (D) Indicates that enlarged SPN exhibited by uncertain cues relative to
certain-neutral cues positively related to the more negative mood ratings of uncertain-neutral pictures relative to certain-neutral pictures. (E) Represents that the
more negative mood ratings of uncertain-neutral pictures relative to certain-neutral pictures contributes to the post-experimental estimations of negative pictures
following uncertain cues.
Regression analyses of emotion and covariation bias showed that
mood ratings of uncertain-neutral pictures compared to certain-
neutral pictures contributed to covariation bias (β = −0.39,
p = 0.034, R2 = 0.12), while mood ratings of uncertain-negative
pictures compared to certain-negative pictures was not related to
covariation bias.
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DISCUSSION
By recording the temporal dynamics of processing under
uncertainty, our study explored two primary questions. First,
how is anticipatory activity influenced by uncertainty and
what is the subsequent effect of anticipation on neural and
behavioral responses to pictures. Second, whether there was a
covariation bias of uncertainty and threat and what were the
possible contributors to this covariation bias. Self-report data
demonstrated a more negative mood rating of uncertain-neutral
pictures than certain-neutral pictures, indicating that emotional
experiences under the uncertain condition were notably less
positive. We also observed a covariation bias such that individuals
overestimated the probability of negative pictures following
uncertain cues. During the cue stage, we detected that neural
activity, specifically in the SPN component, as elicited by certain-
negative cues and uncertain cues, was increased relative to
that elicited in response to certain-neutral cues. In particular,
we found that the amplitudes of SPN evoked by uncertain
cues and certain-negative cues were comparable, indicating how
anticipatory activity was altered by uncertainty. During the
picture stage, larger amplitudes of P2 and LPP were evoked by
negative pictures compared to neutral pictures independent of
condition. Moreover, uncertainty enlarged the positive deflection
of LPP for both negative and neutral pictures. Regression analyses
demonstrated that the enlarged SPN elicited by uncertain cues
relative to certain-neutral cues positively modulated the more
negative mood ratings of uncertain-neutral pictures relative to
certain-neutral pictures. More importantly, we observed that the
magnitude of the covariation bias was related to general arousal
anticipatory activities and the more negative mood ratings of
uncertain-neutral pictures compared to certain-neutral pictures.
These novel findings give further credibility to the notion that
uncertainty can contribute to stress and anxiety-like behaviors.
In the current study, participants reported more negative
mood rating in response to negative pictures under both
certain and uncertain conditions, a pattern which coincides
with the valence of these pictures. However, to our surprise,
participants reported similar negative feelings when negative
pictures appeared following uncertain cues relative to those
following certain cues, a finding which runs counter to that of
Grupe and Nitschke (2011). Such a result may have occurred
because the pictures we used were not sufficiently unpleasant to
produce the previously reported uncertainty-related effect. For
example, the aversiveness of stimuli has been found to influence
both expectancy and post-experimental estimation (Grupe and
Nitschke, 2011; Wiemer et al., 2014). Emotional valence is also
known to affect uncertainty-related neural activities (Lin et al.,
2015). Although, we selected negative pictures with a significant
level of aversiveness compared to the neutral set, those employed
by Grupe and Nitschke (2011) were more aversive (valence
M = 2.32, SD = 0.71). Similar with our research, the study of
Dieterich et al. (2016), in which the valence of the pictures was
less negative (valence M = 2.80, SD = 0.38) than that of the
study of Grupe and Nitschke (2011), also did not produce an
uncertainty-related effect, showing no significant difference in
mood ratings between certain and uncertain aversive pictures.
This is also verified by our post-experimental interviews in which
participants did not perceive the negative pictures to be extremely
dreadful. The unexpected finding deserves further exploration
and also serves to demonstrate an important point about the use
of negative pictures as a tool to induce the experience of threat.
Unlike the threat of electric shock which serves as a tool for
intrinsically high motivational arousal, whether negative pictures
can facilitate the detection of activity associated with the impact
of uncertainty on affect is highly dependent on both their valence
and arousal. In addition, the influence of cultural differences
on anxiety (Heinrichs et al., 2006; Hoge et al., 2006) should
be considered. That the current experiment was conducted on
Chinese students, while that of Grupe and Nitschke (2011) was
conducted on multi-racial populations may go some way to
explaining the disparity in the effect of uncertainty on mood
ratings between these studies.
As hypothesized, we detected a covariation bias whereby
participants overestimate the proportion of negative pictures
that followed uncertain cues (represented as question marks).
Consistent with some previous work (Dieterich et al., 2016), even
though participants were exposed to the relationship of uncertain
cues and negative pictures on multiple occasions, they were
unable to objectively learn the contingency of forthcoming threat.
This covariation bias is fairly important, particularly considering
that it might passively contribute to participants’ psychological
and behavioral activity when facing future uncertain events and
is shown to be related to state anxiety (Wiemer et al., 2014).
During the cue phase, we found that anticipation for certain-
negative pictures and uncertain-negative pictures elicited larger
SPN compared to anticipation for certain-neutral pictures.
In particular, the anticipation for uncertain-negative pictures
reflected by SPN was not different from anticipation for certain-
negative pictures, though the occurrence of negative pictures
under uncertainty was 50%. The mean amplitude of SPN is
related to the attention resources required to prepare and
anticipate upcoming events and varies according to the affective
content of the subsequent stimulus (Bradley et al., 2001), with
larger elicited by emotionally salient stimuli (Simons et al., 1979;
Klorman and Ryan, 1980; Lumsden et al., 1986; Amrhein and
Pauli, 2005). This was also demonstrated in our study which
showed that anticipation for negative pictures elicited larger SPN
than that for neutral pictures. However, when the occurrence of
negative pictures was uncertain, participants’ anticipatory activity
was similar to that for certain-negative pictures. Such a pattern
of results may indicate an expectancy bias for negative pictures
under uncertainty from participants.
During the early processing of pictures, we found that negative
pictures evoked a larger amplitude of P2 than neutral pictures,
regardless of whether they occurred after certain or uncertain
cues. This is consistent with previous findings suggesting that P2
was enlarged by negative emotional stimuli (Delplanque et al.,
2004; Huang and Luo, 2006; Dan and Hajcak, 2008; Carretie
et al., 2013). However, unlike the study of Dieterich et al. (2016)
who found that uncertain-negative pictures produced larger P2
than certain-negative pictures, we did not detect an uncertainty-
related effect on the amplitude of P2. Our result was, however,
consistent with other work from Dieterich et al. (2017), in which
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the uncertainty-related effect was only observed in obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD) but not in healthy participants,
suggesting that the uncertainty-related effect on early attention
to threat is not stable in healthy participants. Future studies
should explore this problem by comparing effects between
healthy participants and anxiety patients. Another interesting
finding of P2 was that negativity and uncertainty delayed its
latency. Specifically, the latency for negative pictures was larger
relative to neutral pictures under both certain and uncertain
conditions. The latency of P2 for uncertain-neutral pictures was
also larger relative to certain-neutral pictures while this was
not the case for uncertain-negative pictures relative to certain-
negative pictures. The peak latency of P2, as an indicator of the
time required for the perceptual analysis at the early stage of
processing, is slower when the processing of visual information
is less efficient (Yuan et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2012). Thus, we
cautiously propose that the observations of reduced efficiency
in perceiving both negative pictures relative to neutral pictures
and uncertain-neutral pictures relative to certain-neutral pictures
might be a demonstration of the ‘avoidance motive’ as caused by
the belief of the occurrence of a negative outcome. For example,
when participants were certain about the negative valence of
forthcoming pictures under the certain-negative condition, in
their mind, they were unwilling to process them, thus when the
picture actually appeared, they postponed their responses. On the
other hand, when the condition was uncertain, participants may
have been inclined to hold a “pessimistic” opinion given the high
probability of a negative outcome (Grupe and Nitschke, 2011). As
a result, the processing of uncertain-neutral pictures was put off
relative to certain-neutral pictures. The uncertainty-related effect
was detected at the late stage of processing as reflected by the
larger amplitude of LPP under the uncertain condition relative to
the certain condition. The uncertainty-related effect for neutral
pictures was also detected, thus verifying the study of Dieterich
et al. (2016, 2017) that uncertainty enhances attention allocation
to stimuli.
Importantly, by examining the relationship between
anticipatory activity leading up to pictures and the subsequent
emotional responses to these pictures, we found that the
mean amplitude of SPN evoked by uncertain cues relative
to certain-neutral cues was positively related to the mood
ratings of uncertain-neutral pictures relative to certain-neutral
pictures. This indicates that the magnification of anticipatory
activity under uncertainty contributes to the increased negative
characteristics of emotional experience. As demonstrated by
previous studies, larger SPN is related to the emotional salience
of forthcoming stimuli (Simons et al., 1979; Klorman and Ryan,
1980; Lumsden et al., 1986; Amrhein and Pauli, 2005). This
was also verified in our findings whereby, under the certain
condition, a larger SPN was found prior to negative pictures
relative to neutral pictures. Thus, the enlarged anticipation under
uncertain condition relative to certain neutral condition (as
indicated by a larger amplitude of SPN) might be a result of or
at least partly influenced by the expectancy of an emotionally
salient picture, which further contributes to the more negative
emotional experience after viewing the subsequent neutral
pictures (as indicated by more negative mood ratings). However,
this modulation effect was not detected for negative pictures
under uncertain condition relative to certain condition. One
explanation may be linked to the less aversive nature of the
negative pictures included in our study, as described above. This
may lead to a failure in detecting the uncertainty-related effect on
mood ratings of negative pictures as well as a failure in detecting
the subsequent modulation effect. Alternatively, the anticipatory
activity under uncertainty might be more closely related to the
occurrence of negative pictures without their associated costs.
That is, prior to the experiment, we instructed participants that
when there was a “?” mark, the subsequent picture might be
either negative or neutral. Thus, when participants saw the “?”
mark during the experiment, their first and automatic reaction
might be the anticipation of the occurrence of a negative picture.
If the subsequent actual outcome was a neutral picture, rather
than simply processing the picture as neutral as would be the
case under the certain condition, participants may, to some
degree at least, process the picture as negative. Participants may
subsequently report more negative emotional experiences in
response to neutral picture under uncertain condition relative
to certain condition. However, when the actual outcome was a
negative one as predicted, they just processed it as they would
process the negative pictures under certain condition.
Surprisingly, and contrary to previous work (Sarinopoulos
et al., 2010), we did not observe any relationship between
anticipatory activities and the neural processing of pictures. The
study of Sarinopoulos et al. (2010) found the anticipatory activity
of ACC activated by uncertain cues relative to certain-negative
cues was inversely related to activities of insula and amygdala
activated by uncertain-negative pictures relative to certain-
negative pictures, indicating a regulatory role of anticipation
on subsequent processing of pictures. However, this regulatory
effect of anticipation (reflected by SPN) on neural processing
of pictures (reflected by P2 and LPP) was not detected in our
study. Distinct neural pathways have been demonstrated during
the anticipation of pain. Using fMRI, the study of Ploghaus
et al. (2003) showed that, when the occurrence of a shock was
certain, expectation was associated with activities in the posterior
cerebellum and rostral ACC, while, when the occurrence of a
shock was uncertain, expectation was associated with activities
in the mid-cingulate cortex, ventromedial prefrontal cortex and
hippocampus. Brown et al. (2008) used ERP to explore the
anticipation of uncertain pain, and the source analysis suggested
that uncertain anticipation engaged cortical areas implicated in
attention, while certain anticipation appeared to engage cortical
areas more closely related to semantic and prospective memory.
This separation might be the reason why we could not detect the
relationship between anticipatory activity and neural responses to
pictures. Further studies are needed to explore this question.
The findings of altered anticipation under uncertainty at the
neural level and its modulation effect on emotional experience
highlight the important role of anticipation and the need to pay
more attention to associated neural activity. One common feature
shared by individuals with anxiety disorders is the presence
of pessimistic beliefs about future negative events (Nitschke
et al., 2009). This kind of anticipation bias has also been
detected during anticipation for uncertain threat in healthy
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participants (Grupe and Nitschke, 2011; Dieterich et al., 2016).
Taken together, these offer a novel insight into the understanding
of how uncertainty might contribute to the pathological basis
of anxiety disorders. For example, anxious individuals usually
have irrational cognition of uncertain threat and appraise stimuli
through a “stretched” dimension, such that they rate fear-relevant
stimulus as more threatening, fear-irrelevant stimulus as safer
and intermediate threat stimulus as more threatening than
non-anxious individuals do (Halberstadt and Niedenthal, 1997;
Cavanagh and Davey, 2001; Davey, 2006). In our study, more
negative mood ratings were reported after uncertain-neutral
pictures relative to certain-neutral pictures and more attention
resources were allocated to uncertain stimuli relative to certain
stimuli (as reflected by the enlarged mean amplitude of LPP),
which might indicate the increased emotional intensity under
uncertainty (Schupp et al., 2010). Such a pattern may have
parallels with the “stretched” emotional dimension utilized by
anxious individuals. Since we have only currently explored the
affective responses to uncertain threat in healthy individuals,
future studies could benefit from probing these problems in
anxious individuals. This would allow the identification of key
differences between groups in the processing of uncertain threat
at neural and behavioral level. Further, though the uncertain
anticipation bias was reported in previous studies (Grupe and
Nitschke, 2011; Dieterich et al., 2016) and the altered neural
anticipatory activity under uncertainty was demonstrated in our
study, the direct evidence of the relationship between negative
belief and neural anticipatory activity is still lack. Researches
focusing on this point would allow the further understanding of
the role of negative belief in the processing of affection, which
will further promote the comprehension of the pathological
mechanism of anxiety.
Further, we found that the covariation bias was manipulated
by the anticipation of uncertain threat, such that the more
participants thought the forthcoming picture would be negative,
the more they thought that the uncertain cue was related to
the negative picture. This effect occurred even after participants
had been exposed to the real relationship between the uncertain
cue and the negative result on multiple occasions. However, this
modulation effect was not specific. Anticipatory activities elicited
by certain-negative and certain-neutral cues also contributed to
the covariation bias in the same pattern. Thus, it seems that it
is the general arousal activities during anticipation rather than
the expectancy bias during uncertain anticipation modulated the
covariation bias. Future studies would benefit from exploring
the relationship among personal characteristics, anticipation and
covariation bias. For example, neuroticism and anxiety sensitivity
have been demonstrated to be related to the anticipatory activity
(Conrod, 2006; Drabant et al., 2011), but it is still unclear whether
these factors lead to general increased anticipatory activities
and then contribute to the covariation bias. Another way to
verify whether uncertain anticipation is specific to covariation
bias would be to exclude the potential influence of personal
characteristics.
Importantly, this covariation bias was partly accounted for by
a more negative emotional experience. Specifically, participants
showing increased negative mood ratings of uncertain-neutral
pictures compared to certain-neutral pictures were more likely
to give a higher estimation that the uncertain condition was
associated with negative pictures. This result demonstrates the
relationship between emotion and covariation bias when the
situation was uncertain. Thus, the estimation of the contingency
between uncertainty and threat may not be simply related to
anticipatory activities for outcomes, but could also be influenced
by the emotional experience of these outcomes relevant to the
current condition. However, we did not detect a relationship
between covariation bias and mood ratings of negative pictures
under the uncertain condition relative to the certain condition.
The absence of such a relationship might be attributed to
the non-significant difference in emotional experience between
the uncertain-negative pictures and certain-negative pictures,
as described above. Future studies might further explore this
question by utilizing more salient stimuli, such as an electric
shock.
Covariation bias takes on great importance in light of its
consistent presence in anxiety disorders (de Jong et al., 1992,
1995a,b, Pauli et al., 1998; Hermann et al., 2004; Amrhein
and Pauli, 2005). The study of de Jong et al. (1995a) found
that the increased likelihood of relapse in phobic women after
treatment was related to their heightened covariation bias of the
relationship between fear-relevant stimuli and aversive outcomes.
Thus, extensive work could explore whether the covariation
bias under uncertainty is a common feature across anxiety
disorders and whether there is any difference of the covariation
bias between healthy populations and anxiety disorders. This
is especially informative considering the possible correlation
between covariation bias and the symptomology and treatment
of anxiety. Further, the presence of a covariation bias associating
uncertainty with negative events might provide a new way of
screening and intervening of populations at high risk of anxiety
and anxiety disorders. Of particular importance, our findings, by
demonstrating the correlation between covariation bias and both
the general anticipatory activities and emotional experience, offer
possible methods to promote objective contingency awareness
and eventually contribute to the prevention or treatment of
anxiety.
A few limitations of the current study should be addressed.
Firstly, though our instructions about the three kinds of cues
were related to the occurrence of negative and neutral pictures,
participants’ anticipation for uncertain threat may have been
related to both the possibility and cost of future negative events.
As a consequence, we were not able to definitively clarify
whether the overestimation of the cost of uncertain threat
or the high evaluation of the frequency of uncertain threat
contributes more to the more negative emotional experience
and the associated covariation bias. In order to explore which
is more strongly related to the development and maintenance
of anxiety, future studies might include stimuli presented under
different probabilities of uncertainty and those vary in both
valence and arousal. Secondly, all of our participants were
young undergraduate and graduate students, thus limiting the
generalization of our findings. Further research might benefit
from the inclusion of groups belonging to a range of ages
and levels of education. Finally, in the current task, the
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pictures recruited in the uncertain and certain conditions were
different. Although we controlled the valence and arousal of
pictures following the certain and uncertain trails, methods of
counterbalancing pictures across all conditions would be a better
way to exclude the possible influence of different pictures.
To summarize, in the present study we observed altered
anticipatory activity and covariation bias of individuals under
uncertainty and their neural and behavioral responses to
potential threat. Importantly, we found that altered anticipation
by uncertainty-modulated the subsequent emotional experience
and both the general arousal during anticipation of forthcoming
stimuli and the emotional experience of these stimuli contributed
to covariation bias of uncertainty and threat. These findings
highlight the important role of anticipation and covariation bias
in exploring how uncertainty might contribute to subclinical and
clinical anxiety disorders.
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